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Mook: Mook: Death of Res Gestae

The Death of Res Gestae
and Other Developments in Missouri
Hearsay Law
Bynote v. NationalSuper Markets, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION

Res gestae is a Latin term that has had many meanings in American
courts. Courts have used it when referring to a variety of hearsay exceptions,
such as the excited utterance exception, the present sense impression
exception, the verbal part of the act doctrine, and statements of mental or
physical condition.2 In Bynote v. National Super Markets, Inc., the Missouri
Supreme Court determined that the use of the term res gestae should be
abandoned in favor of the specific hearsay exceptions it has covered.'
The court also held that any requirement of executive capacity to meet
the vicarious admission of a party-opponent hearsay exception should be
abandoned.4 In addition, the court reviewed Missouri law pertaining to the
state of mind and excited utterance hearsay exceptions.'
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Cynthia Bynote brought this negligence action against National Super
Markets ("National"). 6 Bynote entered one of National's stores to do some
grocery shopping on February 12, 1989. As she approached the checkout
counter with her groceries, she slipped on some liquid on the floor and fell,8
injuring her back. 9 Bynote remained on the floor for a few minutes as she
tried to collect herself." While she was still on the floor, a uniformed
bagger approached and asked if she was okay." According to Bynote, a

1. 891 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1995).
2. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 30 and 123 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 124-134 and accompanying text.
6. Bynote, 891 S.W.2d at 119.
7. Id.
8. Id
9. Id. at 125.
10. Id. at 120.
11. Id.
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checker then came around the counter and said to the bagger, "I told you to
get that water up."' 2 The bagger answered, "I did."' 3 The checker replied,
"Well, I can see the suds from here."' 4 Both the bagger and the checker then
walked away, leaving Bynote on the floor.15 When she got up, she could see
water on the floor, and she realized her hands and the seat of her pants were
wet. 6 She paid for her groceries and left without speaking to a manager. 7
Bynote reported the accident to the store manager a couple of days
later. 8 The manager checked with the assistant manager who had been on
duty when the accident occurred. 9 He said he had no knowledge of
Bynote's fall.2d
The manager testified that it is part of a bagger's duties to cleanup spills,
and any employee could tell a bagger to clean up a spill.2 The bagger and
the checker were not deposed and did not testify.22
National filed a motion for directed verdict.' The motion asserted that
Bynote failed to make a submissible case because (1) her testimony
concerning the statements made by National's employees was not admissible,
and (2) without that testimony, Bynote could not show that National knew, or
by using ordinary care should have known, of the dangerous condition.24
Bynote argued that the testimony is admissible under at least one of three
possible exceptions to the hearsay rule: State of mind, excited utterance, or
admission of a party-opponent. The trial court allowed Bynote s testimony,
over National's objection, based on the exception to the hearsay rule for
excited utterances.2 The jury returned a verdict for BynoteY
The Eastern District Court of Appeals found that Bynote's testimony as
to the statements of the bagger and checker was inadmissible hearsay, and,

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 119.
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therefore, Bynote did not make a submissible case.2' The court reversed the
judgment below.29
The Missouri Supreme Court accepted transfer. The court first stated that
the term res gestae would no longer be recognized as a hearsay exception.3"
The court then found that Bynote's testimony was not admissible under the
state of mind exception, 3' holding that when the statement showing notice is
made after the incident in question, it is not admissible.32 As to the
argument that Bynote's testimony should be allowed under the excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule,33 the court held that when the out-ofcourt declarant did not witness the startling event and the declarations were
not pertaining to the incident itself, they are not admissible as excited
utterances.34
The court determined that the statements of the bagger and checker were
vicarious admissions of a party-opponent.35 As such, Bynote's testimony
was admissible, and she made a submissible case.36 The court held that
when an employee or agent makes an admission while acting within the scope
of his authority, that admission is admissible against the employer or
principal.3 7
Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Res Gestae as a HearsayException
Res gestae38 is a Latin term meaning literally "the thing done"39 or "a
transaction. ' 40 The term has been used by courts since the late eighteenth
century.41 It applied to statements made contemporaneously with conduct at

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 121.
31. Id. at 122.

32. Id.
33. Id. at 122-23.

34. Id.
35. Id. at 124.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Also referred to as resgestaand res acta. 6 WIGMORE
(Chadbourne rev. ed. 1976).
39. WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 1746.
40. WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 1767.
41. Id.

oN EV]DENCE

§ 1767
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issue. 2 When a court applied res gestae, it would say something like, "What
was said by the agent relating to such transaction ... will be received as
evidence against the principal, as part of the 'res gestae'."43 Professor
Thayer found that this use of resgestae probably arose due to confusion in the
law of hearsay. The "convenient obscurity" of the phrase allowed courts to
use it as a "catch-all" when they wanted to allow hearsay to come in but did
not know which specific exception should apply.4
Over the years, res gestae has been used to refer to numerous principles
of admissibility of evidence. The most common applications include the
hearsay exceptions for spontaneous exclamations, including excited utterances
and present sense impressions;45 the verbal part of the act doctrine, where the
statements are actually part of the issue in the case (for example,
defamation);46 statements of a mental or physical condition;47 and various
other situations where declarations are relevant but courts do not state the
specific reasons for admitting them.4" The main rationale for virtually all of
the statements covered by the res gestae exception is the idea that spontaneity
insures trustworthiness."
In Missouri, res gestae has been applied to "verbal act" statements,"
dying declarations, 5 excited utterances," and declarations of state of
mind." It also has been used to refer to the admissibility of statements of

42. 2 McCoRMcK ON EVIDENCE § 268 (John W. Strong, ed. 1992).
43. WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 1767, citing Professor James B. Thayer,

Bedingfeld's Case-Declarationsasa Partof the Res Gesta, 15 AM. L. REv. 1, 5-10
(1881) (citing SWiFT's DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EvIDENcE IN CiviL AND CRIMINAL
CASES 127 (1810) the earliest American treatise).
44. WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 1767 (quoting Professor James B. Thayer,
Bedingfield's Case-Declarationsasa Partof the Res Gesta, 15 AM. L. REv. 1, 5-10
(1881)).
45. McCORMICK, supra note 42, § 268.
46. WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 1767.
47. McCoRMIcK, supra note 42, § 268.
48. WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 1770.
49. McCORMIcK, supra note 42, § 268.
50. See Hamilton v. Missouri Petroleum Prods. Co., 438 S.W.2d 197, 199-200
(Mo. 1969); Sconce v. Jones, 121 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Mo. 1938); Stephen v. Lindell
Hosp., 681 S.W.2d 503, 505-506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. McClure, 504 S.W.2d
664, 671-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
51. See State v. Booth, 515 S.W.2d 586, 591 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
52. Hamilton, 438 S.W.2d at 199-200; Wren v. St. Louis Public Serv. Co., 333
S.W.2d 92, 94-95 (Mo. 1960); Jones v. Wahlic, 667 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984); Walshv. Table Rock Asphalt Constr. Co., 522 S.W.2d 116, 120-21 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1975); McClure, 504 S.W.2d at 671-72.
53. Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Donnelly, 607 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/8
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one co-conspirator against the other,54 statements of employees independent
of a finding of authority, 5 and statements of deceased persons where the
statements are not dying declarations."
The Missouri Supreme Court has said that "declarations made
contemporaneously with, or immediately preparatory to, a particular litigated
act, which tend to illustrate and give character to the act in question are
admissible as a part of the res gestae."57 More recently the court said that

res gestae encompasses two general types of hearsay statements. 8 First, it
covers present sense impressions, which are statements made
contemporaneously with the event at issue.59 The event does not have to be
startling. The factor that ensures the statement's trustworthiness is that it is
contemporaneous with the event at issue.6"
The second type of hearsay statements covered by res gestae are excited

utterances or spontaneous exclamations.6 The use of res gestae as a hearsay
exception has been criticized for many years by Missouri courts, yet its use
has continued.62

54.
55.
56.
57.

State v. Newberry, 605 S.W.2d 117, 125 (Mo. 1980).
Roushv. Alkire Track Lines, Inc., 299 S.W.2d 518, 520-21 (Mo. 1957).
State v. Sutton, 454 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Mo. 1969).
Lewis v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 247 S.W.2d 800, 804 (Mo.

1952).
58. State v. White, 621 S.W.2d 287, 295 (Mo. 1981).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. This exception is covered more fully below. See infra notes 63-75 and
accompanying text.
62. See Statev. Williams, 673 S.W.2d 32,34 (Mo. 1984) ("Modem commentators
discourage the use of the term 'res gestae' as lacking in analytical precision, and as
covering different hearsay exceptions having diverse rationale."); Meyersv. Smith, 300
S.W.2d474, 477 (Mo. 1957) ("For more than seventy-five years the distinguished legal
scholars have repeatedly pointed out, with complete unanimity, the fallacies and
unsoundness of res gestae as a rule of evidence. . . ."); Id. at 477 ("Missouri's bench
and bar, with rare notable exceptions, . .. instead of candidly recognizing certain
contemporaneous or spontaneous exclamations and utterances as a legitimate and
basically sound exception to the hearsay rule, . . . have stubbornly clung to the
shibboleth of the meaningless latin phrase."); State v. Buckner, 810 S.W.2d 354, 358
note 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) ("The term res gestae is now discountenanced as a tool
of analysis of the admissibility of evidence."); Jonesv. Wahlic, 667 S.W.2d 729, 730
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984) ('To the extent more precise terminology may be employed, the
phrase 'res gestae' should be avoided."); Walsh, 522 S.W.2d at 120.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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B. The HearsayException for Excited Utterances
The general rule is that statements made spontaneously after some
startling or exciting event, while the declarant is still under the influence of
that event, are admissible despite falling within the definition of hearsay.63
The event must be "sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal
reflective thought processes of the observer," and the statement must be "a
spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result of reflective
thought."' The theory is that trustworthiness is ensured by the suspension
of the declarant's ability to reflect; the risk of fabrication is greatly
diminished.65 Based on this theory, the availability of the declarant at trial
is immaterial; the excited utterance is likely to be as reliable, if not more
reliable, than the declarant's testimony on the stand.66
Missouri courts adhere to this general explanation of the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule.67 Some Missouri courts, however, have added
the requirement that the statement relate to the circumstances of the startling
event.' In deciding whether or not the exception is applicable to a particular
statement, Missouri courts consider a number of factors. These factors include
the lapse of time between the event and the statement, the physical and mental
condition of the declarant at the time the declaration was made, whether the
declarant was responding to a question, and the self-serving or purposeful
nature of the declarant's statement.69 None of these factors should be
determinative. For example, a statement favorable to the declarant is not
necessarily excluded."
If a statement is an opinion or conclusion of fact reached by inferences
drawn from other facts, it may be excluded.71 Some courts have found that
this tends to show reflection and reasoning, not the necessary spontaneity.72
There has been some disagreement among Missouri courts as to the
correct standard of review to be used by appellate courts when evaluating

63. WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 1746.
64. MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 272. The declarant need not actually be
involved in the event. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. State v. Williams, 673 S.W.2d 32, 34 n.2 (Mo. 1984); Walsh, 522 S.W.2d
at 120-21.
68. State v. Alexander, 729 S.W.2d 486, 489-90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
69. Jones, 667 S.W.2d at 731.

70. Id.
71. See Sconce v. Jones, 121 S.W.2d 777, 781-82 (Mo. 1938); Stephen, 681
S.W.2d at 507; Walsh, 522 S.W.2d at 121.
72. Walsh, 522 S.W.2d at 121.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/8
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whether the declarant was under the influence of the startling event. It would
seem that it is a question of fact, and as such the reviewing court should give
great deference to the trial court's determination. WIGMORE espouses this
view, or a more extreme one of complete deference. 3 Some appellate courts
in Missouri have professed to give at least some deference to the trial
courts.74 In contrast, the Missouri Supreme Court has held that admissibility
is a question of law. 5
C. The State ofMind Exception
Direct assertions about a person's own mental or physical condition have
been covered by a hearsay exception for some time.76 The rationale for
admitting such statements involves the relative value and reliability of the
evidence.77
Testimony as to statements the declarant made contemporaneously with the incident in question are likely to be more reliable
than the declarant's testimony on the stand, where there is opportunity for
misrepresentation and no way to test the assertion."8 As a consequence of
this rationale, such statements are admissible regardless of the availability of
the declarant 7 9
The hearsay exception for direct assertions of the declarant's mental state
should be distinguished from using the declarant's statements to indirectly or
circumstantially show a then-existing state of mind. 0 The latter use of the
declarant's utterances is arguably not hearsay since the statements are not
being used to prove that the fact asserted is true.8 ' Courts tend to fail to
distinguish between the two scenarios. They instead apply the state of mind

73. WIGMORE, supranote 38, § 1750.
74. Jones, 667 S.W.2d at 731.
75. Williams, 673 S.W.2d at 35 ('The trial judge has a measure of discretion,...

but the question of admissibility is basically a question of law subject to appellate
review.").
76. WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 1714. For example, statements such as, "I know
there is ketchup on the floor," or "I feel sick."

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. § 1715.
81. For example, the statement, "Look out-there is ketchup on the floor!" could

be used to prove that there was ketchup on the floor (the truth of the matter asserted)
or that the declarant had knowledge of the spill (as circumstantial evidence of the
declarant's then existing mental state). The first use is hearsay, and the statement

would not be admissible under the state of mind exception. The second use is not
hearsay since the statement is not being used to prove the truth of the matter asserted,
so the statement should be admissible.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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exception' to both, thus ignoring the fact that some of the statements are not
hearsay at all.'
Missouri's state of mind hearsay exception allows an out-of-court
statement into evidence where the statement was contemporaneous with the
event at issue, the statement reflects a then-existing mental state, and the thenexisting mental state is relevant to a genuine issue in the case.' Missouri
courts may also include an additional requirement that the statement must be

made "in a natural manner, and not under circumstances of suspicion."'
The state of mind exception covers both statements directly asserting a
state of mind and statements inferentially establishing a mental state. Some
Missouri courts have distinguished between the two, recognizing that the latter
type of statement is not hearsay at all."6 When using an out-of-court
statement to prove that the declarant had knowledge or notice, it will be
admitted under the state of mind exception only if it is being used to prove the
declarant had knowledge at the time of the declaration.' If the statement is
used to show prior knowledge, it is inadmissible hearsay.' This result
makes sense under the general rule because the statement would not prove a
then-existing mental state but rather a prior- or continuously-existing mental
state. The then-existing mental state of the declarant (where the statement is
made after the accident) is irrelevant. It may seem that a court should be able
to infer backwards and extend a mental state to show prior knowledge, but
backward use of the inference of continuity is generally discouraged.89

82. The Federal Rules of Evidence term this exception "then existing mental,
emotional, or physical condition." FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
83. MCCORMICK, supra note 42, § 274.
84. Kelly v. St. Luke's Hosp., 826 S.W.2d 391, 396-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(citing Missouri Cafeteria, Inc. v. McVey, 242 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Mo. 1951)) (a
statement of then-existing motive or reason for conduct is admissible).
85. Lewis v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 247 S.W.2d 800, 804-05
(Mo. 1952).
86. Singh, 586 S.W.2d at 417. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
87. Jordan v. Robert Half Personnel Agencies, 615 S.W.2d 574, 583-84 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981) (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 583 (emphasis added).
89. See Brook v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio R.R. Co., 270 S.W.2d 827, 831-32 (Mo.
1954) (stating the general rule that "the presumption of the continued existence of a

proven fact does not run backward," but then allowing a backward inference of
continuity under the facts of the case); andLiverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v.
Nebraska Storage Warehouses, Inc., 96 F.2d 30, 36 (8th Cir. 1938) ("[Dlt is often said
that while a given condition shown to exist at a given time, may be presumed to have
continued, there is not, on the other hand, any presumption that it existed previous to

the time shown."). But see State v. Donahue, 585 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979) (quoting WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, 3rd ed., § 2530: "The prior or the subsequent
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/8
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In a case with a fact pattern remarkably similar to Bynote, the Missouri
Court of Appeals explained the distinction:
[T]he contents of the [employee's] statement must have been offered to
prove the truth of the matter assertedbecause [the plaintiff] offered no other
evidence.... of the existence of the substance on the floor.... If the
truth or falsity of the [employee's] statement was not relevant and was in
fact offered simply to show that [the defendant] knew of the existence of
the substance, knowledge would only be from the time that the statement
was made by the [employee]-after [the defendant] fell.9"

Testimony as to statements made to a party will be admitted to show
notice or knowledge of a dangerous condition in general if the statements were
made prior to the accident at issue. 91
Missouri courts may also include other evidentiary doctrines in the state
of mind exception. For example, at least one Missouri court applied the
verbal act doctrine while calling it the state of mind exception.' In addition,

Missouri courts apparently recognize the Hillmon doctrine and include it
within this exception, although it has not been expressly adopted.' Under
the doctrine established in Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v.
Hillmon 4 statements of the declarant's then existing intent to act can be
used to prove that the declarant subsequently carried out that intent or
performed the act.95

existence of... a fact is always evidential to show its existence at a time in issue...
The probability of continuance depends much, of course, on the nature of the specific
fact and the circumstances of each case."); and Whitney v. Central Paper Stock Co.,
446 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (noting circumstances where backward use
of the inference of continuity has been allowed in Missouri).
90. Hunt v. National Super Markets, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Mo. Ct App.
1991).
91. Vinyard v. Vinyard Funeral Home, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 392,396 (Mo. Ct. App.
1968). In Bynote, the court included this circumstance in the state of mind exception,
although the Vinyard opinion did not identify the hearsay exception it was using.
92. State v. Buckner, 810 S.W.2d 354, 358-59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). Statements
made contemporaneously with an action which help to explain the act by showing the
declarant's motive or reason for acting are verbal acts under Missouri law. Id.
93. JOHN C. O'BRmEN, MissoURI LAW oF EVIDENCE § 11-18 (2d ed. 1989).

94. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).

95. Id. at 295-97.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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D. Vicarious Admissions by a Party-Opponent
Vicarious admissions by a party-opponent actually involve two different
concepts. The first is the exception to the hearsay rule known as admission
of a party-opponent, and the second is the attribution of such an admission
made by an employee to the party-opponent employer.
According to WIGMORE, relevant statements made out of court by a
party-opponent are always admissible when they are used against him 96 The
admission does not have to have been against the party-opponent's interest at
the time it was madeY Anything the party-opponent said in the past that is
now inconsistent with the facts asserted by him in pleadings or in testimony
is admissible.98
An admission offered for the truth of the matter asserted falls within the
literal definition of hearsay, but it is admissible because it does not fit within
the rationale for the hearsay rule.99 The only person who would object to the
admission and invoke the hearsay rule would be the party-opponent himself,
and he does not need the protection of the rule because he does not need to
cross-examine himself to test the veracity of the statement."' When a
statement is offered by the party-opponent in support of his case, it then falls
within the reach of the hearsay rule and is not admissible, unless some other
exception to the rule applies.'
Missouri courts adhere to the general rule with some minor variations.
A statement or conduct will be considered an admission by a party-opponent
if- (1) it is a conscious or voluntary acknowledgementby the party-opponent
of the existence of certain facts; (2) the matter acknowledged is relevant to the
case of the party offering the admission; and (3) the matter acknowledged is
unfavorable to, or inconsistent with, the position taken at trial by the partyopponent."° Missouri courts follow the rationale for the exception espoused
by WIGMORE.'

96. 4 WIGMORE ON EvIrENcB § 1048 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1976).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.

102. See Overland Outdoor Advertising Co. v. State of Missouri ex rel. Missouri
Highway and Transportation Comm'n, 877 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994);
Copeland v. Mr. B's Pool Centers, Inc., 850 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993);
Around the World Importing, Inc. v. Mercantile Trust Co., N.A., 795 S.W.2d 85, 89
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990); United Services of America, Inc. v. Empire Bank, 726 S.W.2d
439, 444 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
103. See Stratton v. City of Kansas City, 337 S.W.2d 927, 931 (Mo. 1960); State
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/8
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1

According to Missouri courts, the statement does not have to be a direct
admission of the ultimate fact at issue. It should come in if it relates even
circumstantially or incidentally to the issue.'

In addition, an admission is

admissible even if it contains an opinion, as long as the opinion is within the
scope of the personal knowledge of the declarant.0 5 Missouri courts
disagree as to whether statements that reach a legal conclusion should be
admissible."'
Some Missouri courts have referred to admissions of a party-opponent as
admissions against interest."° This results from confusion of admission of
a party-opponent with declarations against interest. 08
Vicarious admissions of a party-opponent are made not by the partyopponent himself but by an employee or agent of the party-opponent. A
statement falls within the vicarious admission of a party-opponent exception
if it fits within the rationale for the admission of a party-opponent exception

v. Morris, 654 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
104. White v. Burkeybile, 386 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Mo. 1965); Around the World
Importing,795 S.W.2d at 89; Coulter v. Michelin Tire Corp., 622 S.W.2d 421, 433
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Coulter, 456 U.S. 906
(1982).
105. Cummings v. Tepsco Tenn. Pipe & Supply Corp., 632 S.W.2d 498, 501
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
106. Fahy v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 740 S.W.2d 635, 642 (Mo. 1987), cert. denied
by Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Fahy, 485 U.S. 1022 (1988) (legal conclusions are not

admissible); Coldwell Bankers - Gordon Co. Realtors v. Waters, 791 S.W.2d 412, 415
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) ("A party's admissions of fact constitute admissible evidence as
admissions against interest; conclusions of law do not."); cf. Cummings, 632 S.W.2d
at 501 ("A party may relate his opponent's verbal opinion as to fault in a negligence
action, and the evidence is admissible as an admission against interest.").
107. Carpenter v. Davis, 435 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Mo. 1968); White, 386 S.W.2d
at 422; McClanahan v. Deere & Co., 648 S.W.2d 222, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
Cummings, 632 S.W.2d at 501.
108. United Services of America, 726 S.W.2d at 443 ("Missouri attorneys, and
sometimes the courts, often use the terms 'admission against interest' and 'declaration
against interest' interchangeably. This causes unnecessary confusion and uncertainty
as to what the speaker is attempting to communicate. The appellate courts of this state
have long recognized that there is a valid distinction.... ")
Admissionsof a party-opponent differ from declarations againstinterestin several
ways. A declaration against interest must have been against the declarant's interest
when made, unlike an admission. MCCORMICK, supranote 38, § 254. An admission
must be a statement of a party to the lawsuit and must be offered against the partyopponent Id. In contrast, declarations against interest do not have to be made by a
party and may be offered by either party. Id. Also, to be admissible, the person who
made the declaration must be unavailable, whereas availability is immaterial with
admissions. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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and it can be attributed to the party-opponent. The clearest case of
admissibility under this exception occurs when the person who made the
admission had express authorization from the party-opponent to speak." 9
In the absence of express authority, the generally accepted view is that an outof-court statement made by an agent or employee of the party-opponent
should be admitted if it concerns a matter within the scope of the declarant's
employment and was made while the employment relationship continued."'
In Missouri, the general rule is that an admission of an employee will be
admissible against the employer if the employee was acting within the scope
This appears to be
of his authority when he made the statement."'
somewhat different than the generally accepted rule noted earlier. "Within the
exception than the
scope of authority" could be construed as a narrower
12
general rule of within the scope of employment.
A, variation on Missouri's general rule developed in Missouri State
Highway Commission v. Howard Construction Co."' The court found that
to be within the scope of the employee's authority, the employee usually must
have some executive capacity."' This requirement arose from apparent
authority situations; an employee is deemed to have authority to make
statements when the employer created an appearance of authority leading third

109. McCoRNfcK, supra note 42, § 259.
110. Id. at 158. The Federal Rules of Evidence adhere to this view. FED. R.

EviD. 801(d)(2)(D). The federal rules also do not consider admissions by a partyopponent to be hearsay at all. Id. at 801(d).
111. Roush, 299 S.W.2d at 521 (scope of authority of driver to drive truck does
not include authority to make admission of negligence related to driving the truck).
Some courts use the words "scope of employment" but then narrowly interpret them.

See Schultz v. Webster Groves Presbyterian Church, 726 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987).
112. See McCoRMICK, supranote 42, § 259. McCormick distinguishes "within
the scope of authority" from "withinthe scope of employment" by finding that "within
the scope of authority" means that the agent has authority to speak for the employer.
Id. For example, the authority of a chauffeur to drive the car would not include
authority to make statements concerning driving the car. Id. McCormick also cites
Roush, noted in the previous footnote, as an example of this application of scope of
authority. Id.
See also Missouri State Highway Comm'n v. Howard Constr. Co., 612 S.W.2d
23, 26-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (observing that statements would have been admissible
under federal law and finding that the federal rule had not been adopted as the law in
Missouri); Nelson v. Holley, 623 S.W.2d 604, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (noting
distinction between Missouri rule and the federal rules).
113. 612 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).

114. Id.
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persons to believe the employee could make statements for the employer. 5
Apparent authority would be most likely to occur where the employee had
executive capacity." 6 The executive capacity requirement has been noted
by a number of courts. 7
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Bynote v. National Super Markets, Inc., the Missouri Supreme Court
first noted that to make a submissible negligence case, Bynote had to show
that National had or should have had knowledge of the dangerous
condition."' Her only evidence indicating that National had knowledge of
the spill was her testimony about the statements of the checker and bagger.
Therefore, the admissibility of that testimony therefore was the crucial issue
in the case. 19
National's argument that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay
prompted the court to discuss hearsay in general. 2 ' The court noted that the
parties used the phrase res gestae in their briefs to describe exceptions to the
hearsay rule.'2 Citing precedent and WIGMoRE, the court determined that
the phrase was useless because all of its applications are covered by some
other principles of evidence. In addition, the court found that use of the
phrase was possibly even harmful because its ambiguity results in confusion
and creates uncertainty." The court held that the phrase res gestae would
no longer be recognized in support of or in opposition to offered
testimony."
The court then discussed three possible bases for admitting the statements
of the bagger and checker despite the fact that they were hearsay. The first
was the state of mind exception. The court did not discuss the general state

115. Gary Surdyke Yamaha, Inc. v. Donelson, 743 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987).
116. Id.
117. Benner v. Johnson Controls, 813 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991);
Schultz v. Webster Groves Presbyterian Church, 726 S.W.2d 491, 496-97 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987), overruledby, Bynote v. National Super Markets, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 117

(Mo. 1995); GarySurdyke Yamaha, 743 S.W.2d at 524; Kansas City v. Keene Corp.,
855 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Mo. 1993).
118. Bynote, 891 S.W.2d at 120.

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 121.
122. Id. (citing State v. Williams, 673 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Mo. 1984), and quoting 6
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1767 (Chadboume rev. 1976)).

123. Id.
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of mind exception in Missouri, but instead moved directly to a discussion of
the exception when state of mind testimony is used to show that the defendant
had notice of a dangerous condition. The court said that when using state of
mind testimony to show notice, there are two distinct categories: (1)

statements of a declarant when the declarant is the party against whom the
testimony is offered and (2) statements of a declarant made to the party
against whom the testimony is offered, i.e. testimony heard by the opposing
party which would give notice.'24 The first category is admissible if the
statement is made prior to the slip and fall."z Here, because the checker
and bagger made their statements after the accident, the testimony was not
admissible under the first category.'26
According to the court, the second category is not hearsay because such
testimony is not offered to show the truth of the declarant's statements.
Rather, it is offered to show the fact that the statements were made to the
party and that, as a result, the party had notice of the dangerous condition
prior to any injury."r The court found that when a statement showing
knowledge is made after the accident, as it was here, it is not admissible as
non-hearsay because it is being used to prove the truth of the matter asserted:
[T]he only way the trier of fact can decide whether the defendant knew of

the dangerous condition before the slip and fall is to conclude that the outof-court declarant's after-the-fact statement concerning the existence of the
8

condition prior to the incident is true.1

The court next addressed the second possible basis for admitting the
testimony: the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. To fall within
this exception, the court found that there must be a startling event which
overcomes normal reflection so that the declaration is just a spontaneous
reaction to the startling event." 9 The court listed four factors to be
considered in determining whether a statement was an excited utterance: (1)
the time elapsed between the event and the declaration, (2) whether the
declarationwas in response to a question, (3) whether the declaration was selfserving, and (4) the mental and physical condition of the declarant at the time
of the declaration. 3 °

124. Id.
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Id.

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 122.

Id.
Id. The court quoted Jones v. Wablic, 667 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Mo. Ct. App.

1984). The court also stated that the burden of showing that the statement was an
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/8
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Applying those factors, the court found that (1) the declarations and the
startling event were in close proximity, but that there was no evidence that
either employee actually witnessed the startling event (Bynote's fall), (2)
neither responded to a question, (3) both offered self-serving statements, and
(4) neither appeared to suffer mental or physical stress, or even seemed very
In addition, the court noted that the
excited, as a result of the fall.'
statements made by the employees were not even about the fall itself, but
The court cited the rule that to be an excited
about cleaning up the spill.'
utterance, the statement must pertain to "something done, seen or heard by the
'
As a result of this analysis, the
speaker in the course of the accident."133
court held that the statements were not excited utterances, and, therefore, the
trial court erred in admitting them as such.'34
The final possible basis for admitting Bynote's testimony addressed by
the court was admission of a party-opponent.135 The court stated that the
is that the party now objecting originally
rationale for this exception
3'
statement.'
the
authorized
The court then addressed the trial court's finding that the statements here
could not be admitted as admissions of a party-opponent because neither the
bagger nor the checker held executive positions within the defendant's
company. 137 The court held that an executive capacity requirement was
unnecessary because it is not necessarily true that an employee without
executive capacity can never bind the employer. An admission of an agent or
employee will be admissible against the employer where the employee3 was
acting within the scope of his authority when the statement was made.' 1
Applying the rule to the facts, the court found that the evidence was
sufficient to show that the bagger and checker were employees of National at
the time of the admissions and that the statements were within the scope of

excited utterance is on the party offering it.
131. Id. at 122-23.
132. Id. at 123.
133. Id. (citing Straughan v. Asher, 372 S.W.2d 489, 496 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963)).
134. Id. The court found that the inquiry should continue because if there is
another valid basis for admission of the statements, the defendant suffered no prejudice
and the trial court's judgment should not be disturbed. Id.

135. Id. The court did not discuss admissions of party-opponents in general; it
focused on vicarious admissions of a party-opponent, or imputing admissions made by
employees or agents to the party-opponent.
136. Id.
137. Id.

138. Id. at 124. Obviously, as the court notes, this requirement will most likely
be met where the employee is an executive, but the employee is not required to be an
executive.
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their duties."3 9 Therefore, the statements were admissible as vicarious
admissions of National.14
The court then decided that the statements
provided the evidence necessary to show National's knowledge of the
dangerous condition prior to Bynote's accident; therefore, Bynote made a
submissible case. The trial court was correct in overruling National's motion
for directed verdict.'

V. COMMENT
Bynote is notable because it is one of the few recent Missouri Supreme
Court decisions to address hearsay exceptions in any detail. In doing so, the
court made a number of important statements.
First, the court finally laid to rest the imprecise and misleading phrase res
gestae.'4' Courts and attorneys in Missouri no longer have the option of
asserting the res gestae exception when they are unsure of the actual hearsay
exception which applies to the situation at issue.
This is a positive development. As noted above, legal scholars have been
criticizing the use of the term for many years.'43 Also, the law surrounding
the use of res gestae is hopelessly confusing given its large number of
applications and the imprecision of its use.
The court also eliminated an interesting restriction on the use of the
vicarious admission exception which had developed in Missouri.4
It
should now be clear that executive capacity is not essential for finding a
vicarious admission. This should significantly broaden the scope of the
exception in those courts that previously applied the executive capacity
requirement.
It is unclear, however, whether that will occur. The elimination of the
executive capacityrequirement could be an indication that Missouri is moving
toward adoption of the more expansive "scope of employment" exception used
in the federal system. On the other hand, the court's use of Roush for its
statement of the correct rule seems to contradict any such indication since
Roush applied the narrower "scope of authority" exception.' 45 Despite citing
Roush, the court then seemed to follow the broader "scope of employment"
rule when evaluating the facts of this case.' 46 Therefore, the exact direction

139. Id.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
See supranote 123 and accompanying text.
See supranote 62.
See supranote 138 and accompanying text.
Bynote, 891 S.W.2d at 124.
Id.
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Missouri courts will take in applying the vicarious admission exception is
unclear.
The court's application of the state of mind exception to the facts of this
case is less than clear. The court cited a few cases in support of its analysis,
and, as a result, it is difficult to determine how this analysis fits into previous
Missouri law on the state of mind exception. However, there does not appear
to be any significant departure from existing law.

VI. CONCLUSION
Bynote v. National Super Markets, Inc. is an interesting opinion in that
the court addresses hearsay exceptions in more detail than usual. The
abandonment of res gestae and the executive capacity requirement for
vicarious admissions are important and positive developments.
AMANDA BARTLETT MOOK
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